Introduction: Brave the Unknown
Ignorance and surprise belong together. Surprises can make people aware of their own ignorance. A surprise is normally rendered surprising when it occurs unexpectedly and also runs counter to accepted knowledge. A surprise thus cannot be fully understood independently of a person ' s or a group ' s ignorance. In fact, novel things always include elements of surprise, uncertainty, and the unknown, all of which are located outside the sphere of prediction. Consequently, surprising events in research are often something to which scientists aspire in their activities since it means a window to new and unexpected knowledge. Scientifi c methods thus should allow researchers to surprise themselves as well as their peers. What is needed for doing so is an interruption of the continuum between accepted knowledge and future expectations. This interruption can be deemed an important foundation on which new fi ndings are based. However, as Ludwik Fleck observed in 1935, " every new fi nding raises at least one new problem: namely an investigation of what has just been found " (1979, 51) .
New knowledge, in turn, allows for new options without delivering secure criteria for how these new options need to be handled.
The contemporary explosion of knowledge or the observation that our current age is the beginning of a knowledge society thus has a little remarked on corollary: new knowledge also means more ignorance. Thus, surprising events will occur more frequently and become more and more likely. If this is the case, handling ignorance and surprise becomes one of the distinctive features of decision making in contemporary society. The challenge in dealing with surprises lies in the fact that they lie beyond the spheres of probability and risk. This book examines the social prerequisites for surprises, the possibilities of their success, and their conceptual frameworks to better understand the handling of the " startling unexpectedness " that is inherent in all processes of innovation, change, and invention. To illuminate these larger theoretical arguments, the book scrutinizes the surprising effects that are fostered by human interventions into the environment and the way that surprises can be handled in the process of designing landscapes and the restoration of brownfi elds.
Landscapes, Precaution, and Experiment
Why use landscape design and ecological restoration as a touchstone? All over the world, regions exist where human activities have led to vast changes in the landscape -via industrial, military, and mining operations; urbanization and deurbanization; and the conversion of agricultural land or land for leisure activities. These human-made interventions have often triggered highly dynamic processes in landscapes and ecosystems and repercussions in society. To revitalize industrially altered landscapes, both policymakers and scientists frequently communicate that decisions have to be based on reliable scientifi c knowledge that should be free of uncertainty. Public debate on the limits of knowledge is often avoided on the assumption that it would undermine the public ' s confi dence in scientifi c results. Therefore, both ignorance and its material consequences are usually externalized, and only known and observable " facts " are represented in policy and risk-assessment considerations. Ignorance thus becomes an " outlier " or a " black swan, " to use Nassim Taleb ' s (2007) term, because it lies outside of regular and quantifi able events.
Not everything can be known, and absolute certainty is impossible -an inevitability that, as Weick and Sutcliffe (2007, 30) have noted, has culminated in " the hollow maxim ' Expect the unexpected. ' " Furthermore, in everyday life most people know that many things happen to them unpredictably, but there still " is no conceptual language for discussing this thing that everyone knows, " as Howard Becker (1994, 185) observed. Even so, when it comes to making decisions based on science and technology and communicating them to the public, undisputed scientifi c evidence with no side effects is demanded. Contrary to popular belief, there has never been a general belief in absolute truth and certainty among modern scientists and technologists (Moore 2008) . The idea of certainty and truth through science, however, appears to be very much alive in offi cial rhetoric. As researchers on modeling in global climate change (e.g., Shackley uncertainty but use a rhetoric that suggests that this does not imply a serious challenge to the authority of science. Instead, it appears that certainty must be rooted in the rhetoric of scientifi c knowledge, whereas uncertainty and unpredictability indicates the presence of other or " nonscientifi c " sources.
To reassure a supposedly risk-and uncertainty-averse public, emphasis has usually been placed on further research on known uncertainties to create greater certainty and supposed reassurance that the risks at stake will be controlled. Uncertainty normally refers to a situation in which, given current knowledge, there are multiple possible future outcomes. To reduce uncertainty in planning and implementation, the traditional belief is that proper scientifi c results will almost automatically lead to policy and implementation. This linear idea has also been called the " cascade of uncertainty. " Using the example of prediction in climate change, Steve Rayner (2000, 272 -273) has argued that uncertainties in the science of basic earthsystem processes are the basis for more uncertainties over emissions. This makes anticipation of impacts more diffi cult, which is followed by uncertainty about how groups of peoples will respond to such uncertain impacts.
For many observers, cascading uncertainties appear to be a major hindrance to sound policymaking, and this cascade of uncertainty has led to a wait-and-see approach as well as a wait-until-more-science-is-available approach to climate policy. Thus, the funding priorities normally shift to the basic earth sciences to deliver knowledge that is more reliable. Instead of accepting uncertainty as a fact and then placing more emphasis on the possibilities of acting in spite of uncertainties, the least research effort is put into the social sciences and disciplines dealing with social and policy issues to absorb or effectively react to what cannot be avoided anyway.
After all, coping with uncertainties and surprises is fundamentally different from predicting and preventing them. The challenge is how to knowingly and, increasingly, also publicly deal with what is not known without losing one ' s credibility or " scientifi c authority. " Cass Sunstein, perhaps the best-known critic of the precautionary principle, claims that the principle " purports to give guidance, but fails to do so, because it condemns the very steps it requires " (Sunstein 2005, 14) .
I believe that both interpretations -the one that claims that precaution means paralysis and the one that says that precaution must be a key feature in regulatory politics -have not dealt seriously with the importance of ignorance and surprise. The critics ascribe a " better safe than sorry " attitude to the precautionary principle and recommend turning back to cost-andbenefi t analyses and risk assessments based on known facts, thus ignoring the inevitability of uncertainty and ignorance. Proponents of the precautionary principle have not yet delivered any effective strategies for determining what exactly is to be done when decisions have to be made promptly and risk assessments or computer models cannot help in any meaningful way.
By way of building on these two opposing positions, an experimental approach will be developed in this book by reconstructing possibilities for acting in the face of (well defi ned) ignorance and outlining the necessary social and ecological capacities to cope with surprising events. The idea of experiment (from the Latin: experiri , " to try " ) will be of pivotal importance to link ignorance and surprise conceptually and to learn from and cope with the unexpected. The idea of an experiment as a trial or a venture into the unknown is a crucial momentum of any scientifi c enterprise, albeit The challenge ahead is that new knowledge creates new options without delivering secure criteria for handling them. People may welcome the unexpected (since it creates opportunities for innovation), but they also seek to control, steer, or even reverse the surprising events. Understood this way, curiosity and the fostering of surprises enter a paradoxical relationship. They need to be both unleashed and controlled, if not at the same time then certainly in a well-organized and refl exive fashion. In this 
Objectives
First, this book analyzes some classical and contemporary social science accounts of the role of ignorance and surprise in science and ecology and integrates them with the idea of experiment in society (chapters 2 and 3).
In its second half, the book examines the role and importance of an accommodation to surprises and unintended turns in the dynamics of large-scale landscape change and restoration (chapters 4 and 5).
In chapter 2, the reader is introduced to ways that surprises can be theoretically framed as the driving force behind a notion of scientifi c activity and social life in general. Surprises give particular credit to the unsteerable Introduction 7 dynamics of the natural world that cannot be reduced to social, institutional, and cultural issues. To focus on surprising events, a shift away from the focus on the classical institutional preparedness is needed, so that unexpected (or natural) phenomena involved can be reconsidered. In other words, rather than fi nding explanations mostly in social capacities, the focus on the surprising (and in this sense, nonsocial) elements points to the ignorance of human actors about the behavior of the natural or complex technical world. In this chapter, discussions of a " surprises-laden " development of modern society range from the classical writings of Georg Simmel to current debates on new modes of knowledge production. These concepts are scrutinized (using the coevolution of restoration as a public practice and an academic discipline) to understand strategies for dealing with unexpected events. The Chicago school of sociology ' s understanding of modern societies ' experimental development is used to help explain surprises outside of the laboratory as a crucial part of handling unexpected events. To illustrate the normalcy of different types of surprises as they are perceived by different actors, the chapter fi nishes with a discussion of an ecological restoration strategy that includes unexpected elements in landscape development -the return of wolves to eastern Germany.
Since surprises can be seen as a prerequisite for making people aware of their own ignorance, chapter 3 frames different types of unknowns (nonknowledge, ignorance, and the like) as they appear in science and everyday practices. Using Simmel ' s perspective on nonknowledge ( Nichtwissen ) as a touchstone, the chapter develops a notion of how unexpected occurrences can be incorporated into an experimental model of scientifi c and technological development that includes the experimental handling of " sur- of new lakes emerging on the southern edges of Leipzig is enlightening for several reasons. Both regions are characterized by mainly state-funded and -initiated projects to restore and revitalize former degraded or less userfriendly areas. In both cases, the landscape is being " restored " without a historical reference point. In Chicago, a restoration in the strict sense would mean removing the landfi ll that since the 1860s has repeatedly pushed back the waters of Lake Michigan, and in Leipzig, it would mean returning the landscape to its appearance in the premining days from the same era. However, a major focus in the Leipzig case is on a reverse effect compared to the Chicago case. In Leipzig, early signs of success have become increasingly fragile due to lack of openness to surprises and acknowledgment of ignorance -that is, the transformation of ignorance into nonknowledge.
Finally, chapter 6 summarizes the book ' s main arguments but also assesses experimental practices in a broader debate on the contingency and refl exivity of current modernity. It links the overall argument of the book to recent debates on knowledge generation in what Ulrich Beck and others have called second modernity . In second modernity, human societies have begun to realize that not all risks can be controlled and that they must be coped with and incorporated into planning and development. Some of the challenges of implementing strategies that produce both scientifi cally reliable and socially accepted restoration and remediation processes are explored. Experimental practices as an accommodation toward robust research strategies are scrutinized to illustrate the benefi ts and limits of such an approach in contemporary knowledge societies. If we agree that surprises can be a good thing and yardsticks need to be developed over the course of experimentation, how can we avoid turning an experimental approach into a camoufl age for failed projects?
A fi nal word on terminology: I often use the term ecological design although the cases in this book deal with issues such as ecological restoration, the operation of earth-moving technologies, the recultivation of large landscapes, and the management of malaria. I hope that this term helps me avoid the heated debates on the proper defi nition of ecological restoration and its demarcations from other activities in the natural world. Consistent with current ideas in ecological restoration and related areas, the term design also points to a reversion to the attitude of traditional approaches to nature. It represents a step beyond the fatalism that is implicit in much of mainstream environmentalism, which at the core merely calls for a minimization of all human impacts on the natural world.
If we defi ne design , as some authors do, " as the intentional shaping of matter, energy, and process to meet a perceived need or desire, " then design indeed is " a hinge that inevitably connects culture and nature through exchanges of materials, fl ows of energy, and choices of land use " (van der Ryn and Cowan 1996, 8) . Understood this way, architects, concerned citizens, engineers, environmental scientists, and landscape architects are all designers. Design is not bound to a particular profession.
Ecological design thus can be defi ned as any form of human intervention with the natural environment that attempts to improve natural conditions or reverse environmentally destructive impacts.
Given the increase in this kind of design activities, the surprising outcomes that emerge from these activities increasingly defi ne the world in which we live. The question now arises how surprises and the not yet known can be incorporated into our theorizing about modern society. I hope that this book is a fi rst step in that direction.
